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ABSTRACT
Ad auctions are generating massive amounts of revenue for
online search engines such as Google. Yet, the level of ex-
pressiveness provided to participants in ad auctions could
be signiﬁcantly enhanced. An advantage of this could be
improved competition and thus improved revenue to a seller
of the right to advertise to a stream of search queries. In this
paper, we outline the kinds of expressiveness that one might
expect to be useful for ad auctions and introduce a high-level
“optimize-and-dispatch” architecture for expressive ad auc-
tions. The architecture is designed to enable expressiveness
while retaining real-time response to search queries.
1. INTRODUCTION
Ad auctions are big business because they provide infor-
mation about intentional state to advertisers. Rather than
trying to guess the interests (especially the current focus
of interest) of a potential customer, the interaction with a
search engine is one in which a user pushes information to
describe the kind of thing that she is currently interested in
learning about. This provides contextual information. For
instance, a user might be researching on vacation informa-
tion related to Costa Rica, or thinking about buying a new
laptop. For advertisers this represents the ultimate oppor-
tunity in personalized marketing.
Today, the business model of Google is driven by ad auc-
tions, which generated revenue as high as $6,000,000 a day
in the third quarter of 2004. Automated bids are submitted
on behalf of advisers in response to search queries by a user,
with winners gaining the right to display a click-through ad-
vert in a panel adjacent to search engine results.
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Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the ﬁrst page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speciﬁc
permission and/or a fee.
EC’05, June 5–8, 2005, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
Copyright 2005 ACM 1-59593-049-3/05/0006 ...$5.00.
this is a big success. Yet, we wonder: how more more rev-
enue could be generated by ﬁnding ways to allow for new
bid expressiveness in ad auctions? More expressive bids can
lead to better decisions about how to allocate queries to ad-
vertisers, and generate more revenue to search engines by
promoting more competition.
A lot is known about the design of auctions with expres-
sive bidding languages. Combinatorial auctions (where bids
can be expressed on packages of items) are a well-known ex-
ample. Auctions with richer forms of expressiveness—such
as side constraints [16], discount schedules [13, 15, 17], and
multi-attribute considerations [16]—have also recently been
developed, and tens of billions of dollars of industrial pro-
curement have been conducted with such methods [6, 11,
7].
However, the ad auction problem provides additional chal-
lenges:
• First, ads must be served in real time, as quickly as
the response to search queries. Moreover, a search
engine such as Google is serving millions of responses
to queries each day. It is clearly impractical to solve an
NP-hard winner-determination problem in the fraction
of a second that is available to respond to a query.
• Second, this is an online problem in the sense that
there is uncertainty both about supply (since query-
streams are unpredictable) and about demand (since
new bids may be placed, or current bids revoked).
• Third, this is a problem in which budget constraints can
be expected to be important. The process of bidding in
response to queries is necessarily automated to provide
adequate speed, and advertisers can be expected to
want to place constraints on the total amount they
will be billed by the search engine.
We understand that the current state-of-the-art, as imple-
mented by Google, is for an advertiser to submit a bid that
deﬁnes a maximal willingness to pay for diﬀerent queries
(bid price), together with a budget limit for each day. A
winning bid only makes a payment in the event of a click-
through on the advert, and because of this the winning
bids are those with the highest expected payment, as deter-
mined through a statistical model of the likelihood of click-
through. An alternative model is for payments to be made
per-exposure, which can be handled through a simple exten-
sion in which a bidder states that this is a “banner”-style ad
and to be treated as though each exposure is equivalent to aclick-through. In general, the right to advertise in response
to a query can be sold to multiple advertisers, with adverts
displayed in a rank order.
The level of expressiveness is quite sophisticated in the
ability to deﬁne bid prices for various textual queries (based
on “good words” and “stop words”). However, the expres-
siveness is limited in its ability to allow an advertiser to
state values for long-term properties of the allocation. For
instance, an advertiser might want exclusive rights to some
category of queries. Alternatively, an advertiser might care
about achieving some minimal level of exposure, by winning
some minimal number of auctions.
In this paper, we characterize the kinds of expressive-
ness that could be used to enhance the eﬃciency and rev-
enue properties of ad auctions. In addition, we outline
an “optimize-and-dispatch” model for how these expressive
auctions might be implemented in practice. The main idea is
to take high-level optimization decisions in an oﬄine winner-
determination engine, that is then used to parameterize a
simple online dispatcher. The decisions within the opti-
mizer will be based on a statistical model that predicts query
streams. In general, the scheme allows for payments to be
determined both within the optimizer and within the dis-
patcher. There are plenty of details about our proposed
architecture that are not formally deﬁned at this point.
Rather, our intention is to convey a sense of a new style
of approaching the problem. We do this at a level of de-
tail that we believe at least suggests the plausibility of this
approach.
Parenthetically, an apparent side beneﬁt of the optimizer
module is that it may provide new protection against com-
mon forms of Internet fraud that have plagued ad auctions.
For instance, when payment decisions are made in the opti-
mizer and when the role of the dispatcher is restricted to the
implementation of high-level decisions in the optimizer, one
ﬁrm cannot drive up the payments made by another ﬁrm by
clicking on its advert because these payments are deﬁned in
the aggregate in the optimizer, based on a statistical model.
1.1 Related Work
The ad auction problem has received some recent atten-
tion. For instance, Mehta et al. [10] study a model in which
bids express values for diﬀerent queries and an overall bud-
get constraint. The authors explain how to achieve an opti-
mal worst-case competitive ratio for revenue in this model by
adopting a greedy matching algorithm that makes a tradeoﬀ
between bid-price and remaining budget. In one of the few
papers that has considered incentive-compatibility issues in
the context of budget constraints, Borgs et al. [3] study an
oﬄine auction problem (although motivated by ad auctions)
and characterize restrictions on truthful auctions for a sim-
ple multi-unit allocation problem when bidders have budget
constraints (that are private information).
2. PRELIMINARIES
In the basic model (for instance as practiced by Google),
there is a sequence of queries Q
1,...,Q
t ∈ Q that provide
supply to the ad auction. Advertiser i can submit bids bij,
that deﬁne a bid-price bij(Q,E) for diﬀerent queries Q ∈ Q
and diﬀerent environments E ∈ E. The environment, E, can
be used to capture information such as time-of-day or addi-
tional contextual information about a user of the search en-
gine (such as geographical location, sequence of recent click-
throughs, time-of-day, etc.). We can think of the bid-price
as a statement about the willingness-to-pay of an advertiser.
In general, it is useful to adopt the notion of equivalence
classes of queries, with c ∈ C denoting a class of queries,
such that c ⊆ Q. Then, bid-prices bij(c,E) can be deﬁned
on an equivalence class.
An advertiser can also provide a budget-constraint, Bi,
which deﬁnes the total amount that she will spend in any
day. This budget constraint can be further broken down in
a number of ways. For instance, an advertiser can provide:
a budget-constraint Bij for each bid; a budget-constraint for
each bid in a particular class, Bij(c); and an overall budget
constraint in each class, Bi(c). For simplicity we assume
that these constraints apply in conjunction, so that all must
be met in any allocation.
In Google, advertisers only pay when an advert is both
displayed and receives a click-through from the user of the
search engine. Google maintains a model to estimate the
probability Prij(Q) of click-through on advert j from ad-
vertiser i given query Q. In the simple case that a sin-
gle advert is sold in response to a query, i.e. k = 1, the
query is then sold to the bidder with the maximal expected
willingness-to-pay Prij(Q)bij(Q) for a click-through price of
(Pr(Q)b(Q))
(2)/Prij(Q) where (Pr(Q)b(Q))
(2) denotes the
second-highest expected willingness-to-pay for this query.
Thus, the price that the winning advertiser will pay on click-
through is set so that her expected payment is equal to the
second-highest expected payment. At any time the set of
advertisers that compete for queries are those that are still
within their budget constraints. We see that the Google ad
auction has a Vickrey auction ﬂavor to it, in that a query
is sold to the bidder with the highest expected value at a
price such that her expected payment is the second-highest
expected value.
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For our purposes, it will be important to assume the exis-
tence of a richer statistical model, able to predict the types
of queries that are assumed during a day and the numbers
of click-throughs that each advert will receive for diﬀerent
classes of queries. It seems quite reasonable to assume the
existence of such a statistical model given that a typical
search engine sees large volumes of searches each day. We
adopt notation M to denote the model provided by a search
engine, and deﬁne expectation EM {·} with respect to this
model. For instance, we will require an estimate of the ex-
pected revenue in one day in some query class c given some
set of bids, which requires an estimate of the number of
queries in this class and the probability of click-through on
winning adverts.
3. NEW KINDS OF EXPRESSIVENESS
In describing new forms of expressiveness, we break our
presentation into local expressiveness and global expressive-
ness. Informally, local expressiveness deﬁnes adjustments to
bid-price and constraints on outcomes (e.g. “my bid must
appear in the top k positions”) that can be interpreted and
2However, we note that this auction is not truthful for a
bidder because this is an “online” bidding problem [8, 2,
5, 4, 12, 9, 1]. An advertiser might like to time her bids
to be able to advertise at a time of day when there is less
competition, because this will tend to reduce her expected
payment. For instance, if budgets tend to expire later in the
day then a bidder could do better by delaying her bids until
later in the day.implemented based solely on the information local to an
auction. On the other hand, global expressiveness deﬁnes
adjustments to bid-price, bonus payments, and constraints
on outcomes (e.g. “I must receive a minimal quantity of ex-
posures for queries in this category in the next month for my
bid to be valid”) that can only be interpreted in the context
of high-level decisions made across a sequence of auctions.
In our framework, global expressiveness is interpreted and
acted-upon in the optimizer module (and with a view of local
expressiveness in bids), while local expressiveness is inter-
preted and acted-upon in the dispatcher module. More sub-
tly, our proposed optimize-and-dispatch architecture facili-
ties the ability to parameterize the behavior of the dispatch
module based on decisions made in the optimizer module,
and thus the actual behavior of the dispatch module de-
pends indirectly on the global view that is adopted by the
optimizer module and the bid information that is globally
expressive. Of course, in order to handle global expressive-
ness the optimizer module needs access to the statistical
model. Moreover, nothing is guaranteed and the dispatcher
may not succeed in meeting a constraint (for instance on
minimal number of exposures) and thus lose a bonus that
was anticipated by the optimizer.
3.1 Global Expressiveness
In this section, we outline some forms of global expres-
siveness that can be captured in the optimizer module.
Side Constraints
In an expressive ad auction, an advertiser could place con-
straints on the volume of click-throughs, the level of expo-
sure, and the degree of exclusivity provided over some period
of time. These constraints can be interpreted as “these are
properties of the allocation over some period of time that
must be satisﬁed for my bid to be valid.”
Volume-based Constraints. A bid can be associated
with a constraint on the volume of click-throughs. These
volume-based constraints may be broken down into diﬀer-
ent constraints for diﬀerent search terms, and for diﬀerent
time periods. Consider the following examples:
• a bid might include a MINIMAL side constraint to
state the bid is only valid if the bid achieves at least an
average of 1000 click-throughs per-day for the period
of a campaign.
• a bid might include a MAXIMAL side constraint to
state the bid is only valid if the bid achieves no more
than an average of 1000 click-throughs per-day for the
period of a campaign.
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These could also be stated in terms of absolute constraints
on click-through over some period of time. Of course, the
optimizer can only make recommendations and set targets
to the dispatcher, and can only have a statistical belief that
targets will be achievable. The dispatcher is designed to try
to meet targets set by the optimizer, but some things may
3Such a constraint is similar, but diﬀerent, to a budget-
constraint since the payment made by an advertiser need
not be its bid price, and also since the payment made by an
advertiser can also include one-time payments. Thus, the
two types of constraints are incomparable in their expres-
siveness in the general ad-auction model that we introduce
in this paper.
not be possible given a realized sequence of queries in any
particular day.
An advertiser might also care about “smoothness” con-
straints, so that volume constraints cannot be satisﬁed by a
rush of adverts over some concentrated period of time. For
this, we could also allow an advertiser to express volume
constraints on smaller intervals of time. For instance, a bid
can include a side constraint to state the bid is only valid if
the bid achieves at least 1000 click-throughs in every hour.
This can also be relaxed, for example to include a condition
to state a relaxed version such as a bid can only violate its
volume target in some fraction of time intervals.
Volume-based side constraints might also be stated for
exposure, that is, the number of times an advert is displayed,
in addition to (or instead of) click-through rate. In addition,
these constraints can be stated in terms of eligibility, which
is the notion that the bid was at least eligible to compete for
queries for some volume of auctions, or for some fraction of
the total number of queries for which the bid expressed some
non-zero willingness to pay. In general, constraints could
also be broken down into categories of queries in order to
provide ﬁner control over the outcomes that are acceptable
to an advertiser.
Competition-Based Constraints. A second class of side
constraints place restrictions on the level of exclusivity that
a bidder requires when her bids are accepted. These con-
straints can take the following form:
• This bid is valid when it is the only winner, so that
the advert does not appear next to any other adverts.
• This bid is only valid if it appears in one of the top N
positions in displaying an advert next to search results.
(e.g., ﬁrst position, second position, etc.)
• This bid is only valid if it is the exclusive winning bid
in a particular category of search terms for an entire
month.
• If this bid wins, then advertisers from set A must not
appear within some rank distance ±x of the position
of my own advert.
Payment Bonuses
Exclusivity-Based. A bid can deﬁne a bonus that is avail-
able when particular conditions are true about the outcome
of a sequence of auctions for queries in which an advertiser
has expressed some interest.
• For instance, a bid can state a total additional bonus
of $1000 every time Joe’s bid is not shown at all for
some period of time for a particular advert class.
• For instance, a bid can state a total additional bonus
of $5000 when it has the exclusive right to advertise
to all queries in a particular class for some period of
time.
Volume-Based. A bid can also deﬁne a bonus that is avail-
able when particular volume targets are met.
• For instance, a bid can state “I will make an additional
payment of $100 if at least 100 click-throughs per hour
are achieved while my bid is valid.”In cases such as this, the high-level decision about whether
or not to seek the bonus is made within the optimizer, al-
though whether or not the bonus is then collected depends
on whether or not the dispatcher meets the targets.
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These one-time payment bonuses may also be deﬁned in
terms of exposure and eligibility volumes, and might be fur-
ther reﬁned to include requirements about the smoothness
of an allocation across time.
(Global) Click-through Price Adjustments
Global adjustments can also be deﬁned to the click-through
price (or bid-price), for instance based on the total volume
with which a bid wins an auction or based on the total vol-
ume of click-through. Unlike the payment bonuses, this ad-
justment is made to the click-through price and can be max-
imized within the dispatcher by ﬁnding the allocation that
is maximal with respect to the conditions.
For instance, a price schedule can be deﬁned to depend on
the volume of click-through (perhaps broken down by search
term category and by time of day). This payment schedule
can be expressed as a piecewise linear function that depends
on total volume. For instance, the payment schedule can
deﬁne an increase in price as the volume increases, such as
0–100 is $0.00 per click, 100–200 is $0.05 per click, 200–400
is $0.07 per click, etc. For smoothness constraints, a bid
can be eligible for a 5% increase in bid-price if it is eligible
to compete in both the morning and the afternoon periods.
Alternatively, a bid might be eligible for a $0.20 increase
in base-price if it is eligible in at least 60% of the auctions
in a particular category of search terms. Note that these
are described as modiﬁcations to the basic bid-price (which
can be deﬁned as described below), and made within the
optimizer on the basis of a prediction about the allocation
statistics.
3.2 Local Expressiveness
In this section, we outline some forms of local expressive-
ness that can be captured in the dispatch module (and may
also factor into the decisions made in the optimizer module).
A Richer Language for Base Prices
In the basic model, an advertiser states a bid-price bij(Q)
for a query Q. Clearly, there is an unbounded number of
queries that may be executed on a search engine and so it
has been recognized that it is essential to provide a concise
language to allow advertisers to express such a bid-price.
Expressing Bids for Queries. First, we sketch some
methods to provide for a concise yet expressive method to
state a bid-price for diﬀerent queries Q ∈ Q. The methods
are presented from simple forms of expressiveness to those
which are more complex:
1. “Core + Good words, Not Bad words.” First, a bid
bij is associated with some set Coreij words, such that
when any one word in Core is in Q then the base price
is initialized to b
0
ij. Second, for each additional word in
set Goodij up to some limit Lij we add an additional
amount b
add
ij to the base price. Finally, the price is set
4This is one way in which discrepancies between the model
and reality can be handled. Many variations are possible.
For instance, an advertiser could receive a rebate in the case
of partially-met targets.
to zero in the case that any word in set Badij is in
query Q.
2. “Phrases + Good words, Not bad words.” As a slight
variation, we can change the ﬁrst step to require that
one of a set of sequences of words, phrasesij is in the
query, with the notion of good words and bad words
left unchanged.
3. “Class-based, Not bad words.” As a further variation,
we can suppose that the search deﬁnes some semantic
classes c ∈ C for words and that the core and good
word sets are deﬁned by specifying some set of classes
that are considered to deﬁne these sets of words.
4. “URL based.” Perhaps used in combination with one
of the other methods, we can also allow the base price
to be deﬁned in terms of the URLs that are returned
in response to some query. For instance, there can be
a set of core URLs, good URLs and bad URLs. The
idea behind this approach is to leverage the statistical
information implicit in the WWW to guide advertisers
in thinking about their value for a query from a user.
5. “Shadow queries.” Perhaps used in combination with
one of the other methods, we can also imagine that the
advertiser’s bid can also deﬁne a shadow query, s(Q),
that might strip certain words or add words to the
user’s query Q, with the idea that executing s(Q) in
the background within the search engine might glean
further information about the query via the URLs re-
turned. For instance, an advertiser might augment a
query with information about an advertiser’s business
and then gauging the degree of ﬁt between a query and
that business from the number of hits returned by the
engine.
Expressing Preferences on the User Environment. In
addition, an advertiser might wish to express adjustments
or restrictions to the bid price, that depend on contextual
information about a user over and above that which is im-
plicit in the query. In the preliminaries we captured such
additional information within the environment, E ∈ E, not-
ing that a search engine can have additional information
about a user’s recent search history, geographical location,
as well as additional proﬁling information.
Given this, an advertiser i might want to restrict her bid
bij(Q) to users whose environment E ∈ goodenvij, where
goodenvij is some class of environments, for instance deﬁned
in terms of user demographics and location. Ideally there
will be a small set of user demographic and online-usage
classiﬁcations, from which an advertiser can simply pick out
the interesting user types.
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Local Click-through Price Adjustments
In all cases, we can also allow an advertiser to express an
adjustment to her bid price that depends on local condi-
tions, for instance properties about the context of a user or
5For instance, the time-of-day can be handled by dividing
the day into periods such as morning, afternoon, and night
and allow separate bid-prices for each period, or restrictions
to particular periods. Geographic location can be handled
in a similar way, for instance with users in the U.S. divided
into aggregated areas based on ZIP code. Given this, then
bids can be restricted to particular locations or adjusted
based on location.properties about the rank of the advert, or which adverts
are also displayed at the same time:
• For instance, a bid can state an additional per-click-
through payment of $0.20 each time another advert
from some particular ﬁrm would have won.
• For instance, a bid can state an additional per-click-
through payment of $0.30 each time an advert from
another ﬁrm is demoted by some number of slots in
the rank.
• For instance, a bid can provide an adjustment to the
bid-price based on the rank that is received in the auc-
tion. For instance, we could allow the advertiser’s bid
price to decrease by some multiplicative factor that
depends on rank, with
bij(Q,m) = ψij(m)bij(Q) (1)
where m ∈ {1,...,k} is the rank of an advert and
ψij(m) ≥ 0 is some tradeoﬀ function that re-weights
the bid-price bij(Q) for diﬀerent ranks. In general,
we might expect ψ(m) to be a decreasing function of
rank. An advertiser might also state an upper-bound,
maxrankij ∈ {1,...,k} for a bid j, which is the maxi-
mal rank that she is willing to accept.
• Adjustments to base price can also be deﬁned for envi-
ronment conditions, such as time of day, user location,
and current user context.
4. THE “OPTIMIZE-AND-DISPATCH” AR-
CHITECTURE
In this section, we describe the overall optimize-and-dispatch
architecture. The idea is to perform global (combinatorial)
optimization oﬄine in a solver that clears periodically and
provides information to parameterize the fast time-of-query
decisions that are made within the dispatch module. The
optimizer module is designed to handle global expressive-
ness while the dispatch module is designed to implement
high-level decisions made by the optimizer, in addition to
handling local expressiveness. Both models make heavy use
of a statistical model to provide a distribution over queries
and over environments, and to provide the probability of
click-through on an advert given a query.
4.1 The Optimizer–Dispatcher Interface
First we deﬁne the parameters that can be speciﬁed by
the optimizer in tuning the behavior of the dispatcher. It is
convenient to assume that all targets are deﬁned on a daily
basis, although the optimizer itself would need a longer time-
horizon for decision making for instance in the case that
adverts require exclusivity for some extended period of time
such as a month.
It is helpful to sub-divide the parameters into two groups.
The ﬁrst group of parameters deﬁnes overall targets that the
dispatcher should meet during the day and is satisﬁed via a
“throttling” mechanism that controls access to auctions in
the dispatcher:
• Budget targets. ˜ Bi(c), ˜ Bij(c), ˜ Bi and ˜ Bij deﬁne the
target budget for advertiser i on queries in class c,
for bid j from advertiser i on queries in class c, for
advertiser i overall, and for advertiser i on bid j overall.
• Volume targets. clickfracij(c) ∈ [0,1] deﬁnes the frac-
tion of clicks that bid j from advertiser i should win
from all clicks in class c. exposurefracij(c) ∈ [0,1] de-
ﬁnes the fraction of adverts that should be awarded to
bid j from advertiser i in class c. eligibilityfracij(c) ∈
[0,1] deﬁnes the fraction of adverts for which bid j
should be eligible to compete. All of these volume-
based considerations can also be deﬁned in absolute,
rather than relative, terms.
The second group of parameters are used to modify the
precise rules used to clear any particular auction in the dis-
patcher, for instance placing constraints on the number of
winners for a particular class:
• Weight wij(c,E) ≥ 0. This is the priority given to a
bid within the dispatcher, providing an adjustment to
the bid-price in determining which bid wins an auction,
by class and by environment.
• Reserve prices. reserve(c,E) deﬁnes a reservation price
for queries in class c, such that no adverts with an
expected willingness-to-pay less than this will be dis-
played and the payments of winning adverts will be at
least this in expectation.
• Max number of winners. max(c,E) deﬁnes the maxi-
mal number of adverts than be displayed in response
to any query in class c and for environment E.
• Maximal rank. maxrankij(c,E) deﬁnes the maximal
rank that an advert j from i can receive in responding
to a query in class c and for environment E.
In fact, we believe that signiﬁcant power can come from
simply restricting the optimizer to specifying weights wij(c,E)
and reserve prices, reserve(c,E). For instance, notice that
as a special case this allows the optimizer to provide an ad-
vert with an exclusive right to win, by setting its weight to
1 and the weights of other adverts to 0 for some class. As
another special case, this allows the adverts that are eligible
to compete to be systematically controlled during the day,
since a simple environment E can include the local time-of-
day of a search engine user.
4.2 The Optimizer Module
The optimizer module is executed periodically, and does
not need to provide instantaneous responses. It is used to
parameterize the dispatcher, by providing eligibility weights
wij(c,E) as well as budget and volume targets, reserve prices,
and constraints on the maximal number of adverts that can
be displayed for some classes of queries as well as constraints
on maximal rank.
Overall, we view this as a hierarchical optimization prob-
lem. Let x ∈ X denote the output of the optimizer, deﬁning
all of the information that is used to parameterize the dis-
patcher (including eligibility weights and targets). Given a
set of bids, bids, the most general problem can be considered
in the following form:
max
x∈X
X
c∈C
[EM{rev(c,xc,bids,qc)} + EM{bonus(c,xc,bids,qc)]
s.t xc ∈ FeasM(c,bids), ∀c ∈ C
x ∈ FeasM(bids)where x = (x1,...,xC) ∈ X is factored into decisions for
each category c ∈ C of queries, but there are linking con-
straints FeasM(bids) that ensure, for instance, that the over-
all budget-constraint for any one advertiser is respected in
expectation. Notation FeasM(c,bids) indicates a set of con-
straints implied by the bids and model M on the allocation
xc on query class c.
The terms in the objective can then be interpreted as
follows:
• Revenue rev(c,xc,bids,qc) deﬁnes the revenue collected
in the dispatcher from queries in category c given de-
cision xc, bids bids and given some realized sequence
of queries qc. The optimizer’s goal is to maximize
the expected revenue, with queries qc as predicted in
model M. Naturally, the expected revenue depends on
the rules of the auction in the dispatcher module (e.g.
second-price vs. ﬁrst-price, etc.).
• Bonus bonus(c,xc,bids,qc) deﬁnes the anticipated bonus
payment collected in the optimizer from queries in class
c given decision xc, bids bids and given some realized
sequence of queries qc. Again, this is deﬁned in ex-
pectation with respect to model M. The bonus can
be broken down into the components deﬁned within
the global expressiveness in each bid, for instance to
include a bonus for meeting volume targets and exclu-
sivity targets.
Certainly part of the feasibility constraints are related
to budget constraints. For instance, given model M and
decision x
∗
c, and breaking down revenue and bonus to a
particular bidder and to a set of bids j ∈ Bi submitted
by that bidder, we can include the following constraint in
FeasM(c,bids):
γ1 · [
X
j∈Bi
EM{revij(c,x
∗
c,bids,qc)}+
EM{bonusij(c,x
∗
c,bids,qc)}] ≤ Bi(c), ∀i,
where γ1 ≥ 1 is some parameter to tune how risk-averse the
optimizer is in its interpretation of the model. Similar con-
straints can be expressed for the other possible forms of bud-
get constraints. For instance, the global linking constraints
in FeasM(bids) can include overall budget constraints that
are expressed at the bidder level:
γ2 · [
X
c∈C
X
j∈Bi
EM{revij(c,x
∗
c,bids,qc)}+
EM{bonusij(c,x
∗
c,bids,qc)}] ≤ Bi, ∀i,
where γ2 ≥ 1 is another parameter to tune how risk-averse
the optimizer is in its interpretation of the model, and Bi is
used here to denote the overall budget constraint of bidder
i.
4.3 The Dispatcher Module
The dispatcher module is executed in real time and serves
adverts in response to queries. The main control mechanism
adopted within the dispatcher is to throttle the rate at which
each bid can compete for queries, in order to implement the
targets speciﬁed by the optimizer. Given a query, Q, the
basic decision facing the dispatch module, before running a
simple auction, is to decide which bids to allow to compete.
It is this simplicity of the dispatcher behavior that allows
for real-time response and thus enables our optimize-and-
dispatch architecture for ad auctions. Once the bids that
are eligible to compete for a query are determined, the auc-
tion can be cleared, respecting and utilizing information on
weighted-eligibility, max-rank position, max-number of win-
ners, bid-price, reservation-price, and budget constraints.
For simplicity, we assume that the basic auction adopted by
the dispatcher module is a simple variation on the Vickrey-
style payments adopted by Google.
The working assumption in the dispatcher module is that
any exclusivity constraints or bonuses (or similar global ex-
pressiveness) that was deﬁned within bids has already been
factored into the decision made by the optimizer, and is cap-
tured within the targets and other parameterizations that
are passed to the dispatcher. Thus, the only role of the
dispatch module is to try to achieve the targets.
Throttling
Let eligib(Q,E) ⊆
S
i Bi denote the bids that are eligible to
compete in some auction Q given environment E. The dis-
patcher uses a simple throttling rate, αij(c,E) ∈ [0,1] for bid
j from advertiser i in query class c and given environment
E. This deﬁnes the probability with which the bid is eligi-
ble to compete. Given query Q and environment E, each
bid that is interested in the query (i.e. with some non-zero
base price) is eligible to compete with probability αij(c,E)
where Q ∈ c. A simpler version could deﬁne some throttling
parameter αij(c) that depends only on the semantic class,
or even some αij that is the same for bidder i across all
queries.
Our thought is that one can adopt standard control-theoretic
techniques to adjust control parameters αij to keep the
budget, click-through, exposure, and eligibility within some
bounds for each bid and for each target class. For instance,
one can deﬁne bounds on acceptable behavior in tracking a
target during a day, and then take corrective measures when
the behavior falls outside this acceptable range. Whether or
not this simple throttling mechanism is suﬃciently powerful
in practice, and can meet the targets set within the opti-
mizer, is an important area for practical testing.
Sometimes conﬂicts might arise between diﬀerent targets,
that were unanticipated within the optimizer. We propose
to handle these through a simple prioritization scheme. For
instance, we propose that the dispatcher be deﬁned to con-
sider the following prioritization for breaking conﬂicts:
budget-target ≺ click-through targets ≺ exposure targets
≺ eligibility targets.
The dispatcher ﬁrst strives to keep within the budget tar-
get, and then from all decisions that achieve this chooses
that which best meets the click-through targets, and so on.
An Individual Dispatcher Auction
Once the set of competiting bids eligib(Q,E) is determined
for a query Q and environment E, these bids are considered
within a standard (although budget-modiﬁed and weighted)
generalization of a Vickrey-style auction.
Consider an example with the following bids, with weights,
probability of clickthrough, and bid-price as deﬁned:
bid 1: weight 2, prob 0.1, bid-price $30
bid 2: weight 1, prob 0.2, bid-price $20
bid 3: weight 1, prob 0.5, bid-price $4Suppose that the method is to auction a single slot (either
for reasons of local expressiveness constraints or because of
the maxk constraint from the optimizer.)
Now, the bid with the highest expected weighted bid-price
is bid 1, because its expected weighted price is $6, compared
with $4 and $2 from bidders 2 and 3. Then, the payment
from the winning bidder is (4 · (1/2))/(0.1), which is $20.
This is the second-highest expected weighted payment re-
scaled by the weights of bidder 1 and 2, and then normalized
for the probability of clickthrough on bid 1. The ﬁnal ex-
pected payment is guaranteed to be less than the maximum
willingness-to-pay, and shares the same truthfulness prop-
erties as the Vickrey-style payments adopted in Google (i.e.
without considerations about sequential bidding strategies.)
More generally, we can deﬁne the winner-determination
problem in the auction as follows:
max
xik
N X
i=1
M X
k=1
wij(c,E) · pricei(k) · xi,k +
M X
k=1
x0,kreserve(c,E)
s.t.
N X
i=0
xik ≤ 1, ∀k ≤ M (2)
N X
i=1
xi,k+1 ≤
N X
i=1
xi,k, ∀k < M (3)
N X
i=1
xik ≤ 1, ∀k (4)
N X
i=1
M X
k=1
xik ≤ max(c,E) (5)
xik = 1, ∀i ≥ 1,∀k > maxrankij(c,E) (6)
xik ∈ {0,1},
where xik indicates whether bid i wins slot k (with a smaller
k indicating a higher rank), where wij(c,E) is the weight as
deﬁned for bid j from advertiser i that is relevant for the
current query and environment (and similarly for max(c,E)
and maxrankij(c,E)). Constant pricei(k) is the expected
payment from the bidder if it wins, deﬁned as the mini-
mal of the bid-price from advertiser i for rank k (perhaps
adjusted both due to global expressiveness and local expres-
siveness) and the remaining budget, and then multiplied by
the probability of click-through. Bidder 0 simulates the role
of the reserve price reserve(c,E) for this query, and is willing
to buy any number of slots for this price.
Constraints 2 ensure that no slot is sold more than once.
Constraints 3 ensure that slots are allocated highest-rank
ﬁrst. Constraints 4 ensure that no bid is allocated more
than one slot. Constraints 5 respects the condition from
the optimizer that might limit the total number of winners.
Constraints 6 respects the limit from the optimizer on the
rank that an advertiser is willing to accept. Additional con-
straints, for instance to provide for exclusivity, or separation
to competitors, etc. can also be introduced.
Let V (N) deﬁne the revenue with all bids, and V (N \ i)
deﬁne the revenue without bid i. The (expected) generalized
Vickrey payments are deﬁned for winners as, pgva,i =
1
wij(c,E)

V (N \ i) −
X
i06=i
X
k
wi0j(c,E)pricei0(k)x
∗
i0k


(7)
where x
∗ denotes the allocation computed in the solution
to V (N) with all bids; the ﬁnal click-through payment is
then deﬁned by dividing through by the probability of click-
through for bid i.
4.4 Closing the Loop
The idea is to rerun the optimizer periodically, always
with the newest information about bids, the newest model
of the projected query stream, and the newest information
about execution so far (which ads were shown at which ranks
at which times, and whether or not they were clicked). The
incorporation of the execution history allows the optimizer
to in eﬀect monitor the execution and re-parameterize the
dispatcher as needed so that the actual execution follows the
optimized plan closely.
5. AN ANALOGY TO TRADITIONAL ME-
DIA BUY
The optimize-and-dispatch architecture has an analog in
traditional (TV ad) media buying. In that manual negoti-
ation, the buyers negotiate manually with the sellers in a
rather expressive language once a year (in an intense multi-
day negotiation conference). That negotiation leads to a
high-level plan of how ad time is allocated to the buyers,
taking into account time-of-day, viewer segment, and other
considerations. The execution over the year does not exactly
follow the plan because shows get canceled and introduced,
there are outages, etc. To mitigate that online aspect, the
TV broadcasters dispatch ads as they best see ﬁt so as to
try to roughly adhere to the overall plan for the year. (At
the end of the year, signiﬁcant discrepancies are addressed
with rebates.)
6. CONCLUSIONSANDFUTURERESEARCH
Ad auctions are generating massive amounts of revenue
for companies such as Google with online search engines.
Yet, the level of expressiveness provided to participants in
ad auctions could be signiﬁcantly enhanced. An advantage
of this could be improved competition and thus improved
revenue to a seller of the right to advertise to a stream of
search queries. This beneﬁt does not necessarily come from
making the buyers worse oﬀ: while the buyers end up poten-
tially paying more, they have better control and targeting of
their marketing campaigns. In this paper, we outlined the
kinds of expressiveness that one might expect to be useful
for ad auctions and introduced a high-level “optimize-and-
dispatch” architecture for expressive ad auctions. The archi-
tecture is designed to enable expressiveness while retaining
real-time response to search queries.
Future research includes implementing a system based
on this architecture—and using (generalizations of) state-
of-the-art commercial winner determination algorithms [14]
within the optimizer module. It will then be exciting to see
1) which expressiveness forms the buyers will ﬁnd useful, 2)
how much the increased expressiveness improves the auc-
tions, and 3) how often the optimizer needs to be re-run in
practice so as to keep the execution closely enough aligned
with the optimized plan (clearly there is a tradeoﬀ between
supporting rich expressiveness leading to slower optimiza-
tion, and following the plan more closely by running the
optimizer more often).7. REFERENCES
[1] B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, and A. Meyerson. Reducing
truth-telling online mechanisms to online
optimization. In Proc. ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing (STOC’03), 2003.
[2] A. Blum, T. Sandholm, and M. Zinkevich. Online
algorithms for market clearing. In Annual ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages
971–980, San Francisco, 2002.
[3] C.Borgs, J.Chayes, N.Immorlica, M.Mahdian, and
A.Saberi. Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained
bidders. In Proc. ACM Conf. on Electronic
Commerce, 2005.
[4] M. T. Hajiaghayi, R. Kleinberg, M. Mahdian, and
D. C. Parkes. Online auctions with re-usable goods. In
Proc. ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, 2005. To
appear.
[5] M. T. Hajiaghayi, R. Kleinberg, and D. C. Parkes.
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. In Proc.
ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, pages 71–80,
2004.
[6] G. Hohner, J. Rich, E. Ng, G. Reid, A. J. Davenport,
J. R. Kalagnanam, H. S. Lee, and C. An.
Combinatorial and quantity-discount procurement
auctions beneﬁt Mars, incorporated and its suppliers.
Interfaces, 33(1):23–35, 2003.
[7] R. Hughes, J. Jacobs, D. Begg, T. Sandholm,
D. Levine, and M. Concordia. Changing the game in
strategic sourcing at Procter & Gamble: Expressive
competition enabled by optimization. Interfaces, 2005.
Edelman award competition ﬁnalist writeup.
[8] R. Lavi and N. Nisan. Competitive analysis of
incentive compatible on-line auctions. In Proc. 2nd
ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), 2000.
[9] R. Lavi and N.Nisan. Online ascending auctions for
gradually expiring goods. In In Proc. SODA’05, 2005.
[10] A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, and V. Vazirani.
Adwords and generalized on-line matching. Technical
report, Georgia Tech, 2005.
[11] T. Metty, R. Harlan, Q. Samelson, T. Moore,
T. Morris, R. Sorensen, A. Schneur, O. Raskina,
R. Schneur, J. Kanner, K. Potts, and J. Robbins.
Reinventing the supplier negotiation process at
Motorola. Interfaces, 35(1):7–23, 2005.
[12] R. Porter. Mechanism design for online real-time
scheduling. In Proc. ACM Conf. on Electronic
Commerce (EC’04), 2004.
[13] T. Sandholm. eMediator: A next generation electronic
commerce server. Computational Intelligence,
18(4):656–676, 2002. Special issue on Agent
Technology for Electronic Commerce. Early versions
appeared in the Conference on Autonomous Agents
(AGENTS-00), pp. 73–96, 2000; AAAI-99 Workshop
on AI in Electronic Commerce, Orlando, FL, pp.
46–55, July 1999; and as a Washington University, St.
Louis, Dept. of Computer Science technical report
WU-CS-99-02, Jan. 1999.
[14] T. Sandholm. Winner determination algorithms. In
P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg, editors,
Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, 2005.
[15] T. Sandholm and S. Suri. Market clearability. In
Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Joint
Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages
1145–1151, Seattle, WA, 2001.
[16] T. Sandholm and S. Suri. Side constraints and
non-price attributes in markets. In IJCAI-2001
Workshop on Distributed Constraint Reasoning, pages
55–61, Seattle, WA, 2001. To appear in Games and
Economic Behavior.
[17] T. Sandholm and S. Suri. Optimal clearing of
supply/demand curves. In 13th Annual International
Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC),
Vancouver, Canada, Nov. 2002. Also appeared in the
proceedings of the AAAI-02 workshop on Agent-Based
Technologies for B2B Electronic Commerce (AAAI
Technical Report WS-02-01), pp. 15–22, Edmonton,
Canada.